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The Great Divide: What Dr. Moreau Tells Us About
Posthumanism and the Anthropocene
Cynthia Rosenfeld
North Carolina State University
This critique of three films of The Island of Dr. Moreau, a classic story that
keeps resurfacing in popular culture, aims to shed light on the geologic era in
which we live, the Anthropocene. What do these films reveal about the Western
conceptualization of the differences between “human” and “animal,”
and what does this conceptualization reveal about the Anthropocene? The
post-human analysis primarily employs concepts from Lacan, Derrida, and
Eagleton, and includes a detailed look at the role of language. Dr. Moreau’s
conceit of human uniqueness (and superiority) fosters the kind of thinking
that allows humanity to ignore the natural consequences of its actions. The
analysis concludes with a discussion of Haraway’s Chthulucene, a counter
to the Anthropocentric speciesism that lead us to the Anthropocene and
Dr. Moreau to his island.
Keywords: The Island of Dr. Moreau, Anthropocene, posthumanism, Lacan,
Eagleton, Derrida, Haraway
H.G. Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau, published in 1896, is a fictional tale
of a scientist who attempts to surgically engineer nonhuman animals into
humans. The novel is credited with creating the “uplift” motif in science
fiction, in which a more advanced species intervenes in the lives of a less
advanced species to elevate them (Booker, 2014). The Planet of the Apes
franchise is a successful, contemporary example of this motif, grossing over
$2 billion worldwide (Hughes, 2017).
The Island of Dr. Moreau was critically analyzed by Rohman (2009)
to find what the story reveals about human-nonhuman animal distinctions.
Rohman argued the novel reveals the fluidity of boundaries between human
and other animals. This theme emerges early in the novel, with the protagonist
stranded on a lifeboat with two others. Dehydrated and starving, the two
other survivors tumble overboard in a fight over who will get to eat whom,
a battle to decide the roles of cannibal and food source. Rohman states that
this scene depicts the tenuous nature of humanity’s claim of transcendence.
This analysis extends Rohman’s work through an examination of the
three major motion picture adaptations of the novel (1932’s Island of Lost
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Souls, 1977’s The Island of Dr. Moreau, and 1996’s The Island of Dr. Moreau).
Films based on novels may have a power that transcends the original source;
Ingmar Bergman notes, “Film as dream, film as music. No art passes our
conscience in the way film does, and goes directly to our feelings, deep down
into the dark rooms of our souls” (as cited in Georgaris, 2007). Films offer
a sense of “being there” that implores audiences to go beyond seeing and
hearing to scrutinizing and listening (Barthes, 1977). As creative artifacts,
films are poised to offer insights into contemporary hegemonic narratives.
The film adaptations of The Island of Dr. Moreau, a classic story that keeps
resurfacing in popular culture, offer a cautionary tale of humanistic hubris,
and this critique aims to shed light on the geologic era in which we live, the
Anthropocene. Geologists recognize the present era as the Anthropocene, a
time marked by humanity’s impact on nature (Steffen, Grinewalk, Crutzen, &
McNeill, 2011). With this in mind, a tale of a scientist dedicated to converting
all life to human form seems a worthy place to investigate the potential causes
and consequences of such an era.
Specifically, this paper addresses the questions: what do these films
reveal about the Western conceptualization of the fundamental difference(s)
between “human” and “animal”? What does an understanding of the
character of Dr. Moreau reveal about how humans have been able to
construct the Anthropocene?
A Posthuman Perspective on Dr. Moreau
This paper approaches the research questions through a Lacanian
psychoanalytic, posthuman critique of the movies’ title character, Dr. Moreau.
Posthumanism is a paradigm that examines phenomena with consideration to
how humans and nonhumans are intertwined and both shape and are shaped
by each other (Cavell, Diamond, McDowell, Hacking, & Wolfe, 2008;
Haraway, 2016; Wolfe, 2003, 2012). In contrast, humanism is any system
of thought that centralizes humanity, privileges the welfare of humans, and
focuses on human reason and rationality. Posthumanism is not anti-humanism
(Lennard & Wolfe, 2017), nor is it a zoophilic or technophilic method of study.
Rather, posthumanism is a deconstruction of humanism that problematizes
the sharp distinctions separating “culture” from “nature” and “human” from
“other.” Posthumanistic studies attempt to de-center the human through
acknowledgment that nonhumans, both nonhuman animals and the larger
nonhuman world (e.g., technology, landscape), have agency to shape human
experience. Further, posthumanism does not isolate the human mind from
the body. The paradigm looks at human communication, behaviors, and
productions as embodied, lived experiences of human systems interacting
with other systems and provides a “mode of understanding of the kind of
animal we are” (Diamond, 2008, p. 56).
Posthumanisitic studies serve to de-center the human. Derrida’s (1993)
critiques of the center and telos provide a means to understand both the
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character of Dr. Moreau and the role that anthropocentrism plays in the
constructing the Anthropocene. The center is the element that gives order
to a structure; it gives meanings to its components, designates permissible
interactions, cannot be substituted or eliminated, and is located both within
and outside of the structure. In Judeo-Christianity, God is such a center:
an idea that structures the world and makes up the world yet exists beyond
explanation and understanding. Telos is the concept of “an end”—a goal,
an ultimate. Derrida (1993) asserts that there is no true center and no true
end, rather that phenomena exist in free play with one another. However, the
human desire to create both centers and telos is ingrained.
Dr. Moreau is a brilliant scientist and physician who discovers a means
to temporarily convert living creatures into another species—humans.
He positions himself as the arbiter of what it means to be human through
his conversions. As a scientist, Moreau needs to define what constitutes
“human” so that he has a measure to gauge the success of his experiments
on the nonhuman creatures. Moreau has tasked himself not only with the
physicality of converting one species to another but also with the ontological
distillation of the essence of humanity. The science and technology that afford
Moreau the ability to convert the island’s creatures is one matter. The more
pressing matter for understanding the Anthropocene is Moreau’s ideological
assumptions that guide his use of said science and technology: the belief that
humanity is the telos of animalia.
“Man is the present climax of a long process of organic evolution. All
animal life is tending toward the human form,” Moreau tells Mr. Parker, a
human brought to the island (Paramount Pictures, 1932). Seeing humanity
as the apex of evolution, Moreau—as someone able to create “humans”—
positions himself as “God-like” (Paramount Pictures, 1932), a “father” to
his creations (Pressman & Frankenheimer, 1996), and a savior who elevates
“lower” animals (Paramount Pictures, 1932). Moreau seems to believe he
is the center of an island on which animals are able to obtain their telos.
Although Moreau cannot be a true center, his beliefs and actions are certainly
central to the lived experiences of the creatures on the island and therefore
need to be examined.
The Ideas of Father Moreau
Lacanian psychoanalysis (e.g., 1977a, 1977b, 1992) is used to examine
the character of Dr. Moreau. Lacanian psychoanalysis differs from the more
familiar and humanistic Freudian psychoanalysis (often simply referred
to “psychoanalysis”) in that Lacan uses psychoanalysis to illuminate how
humans exist in and are part of the world. Approaching Dr. Moreau from
a Lacanian perspective, the character’s actions and ideas can be seen as
interconnected and co-created by the world in which Moreau exists.
Lacan (1977a, 1977b, 1992) states that beings are born into an Imaginary
Order. The Imaginary Order is the world of images, in which infants exist
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before they obtain language. In the Imaginary Order, individuals live in
a state of illusory bliss: they are fulfilled, delighted, and have a sense of
completeness. They feel at-one-with the world and, specifically, their
mother. This is the order in which all beings—including Dr. Moreau and
his creatures—are born. However, human infants differ from other animals
because they are developing in a world always already shaped by a second
order, The Symbolic Order.
From the Imaginary Order, humans are forced into the Symbolic Order
through the acquisition of language. Language forces separateness because
it inherently implies a sense of loss: one would not need words if one felt
inseparable from the surrounding world. In the Symbolic Order, individuals
learn of their separateness from the world, most significantly from their
mother, and their sense of fulfillment is forever lost. This is the birthplace
of the unconscious (Evans, 1996; Lacan, 1977a, 1977b, 1992).
Important in the Symbolic Order are the themes of the father and The
Law. For Lacan, the father is the figure that divides the infant from the
mother and introduces the infant to the rules the infant will obey and the
roles the infant will play in the world. These rules and roles create The Law,
the fundamental principles of all social relations (Evans, 1996). The Law is
fundamentally linguistic and essentially human (Lacan, 1977a). For Lacan
(1977a), The Law is what separates humans from nonhuman animals because
it instills in humans a code that regulates, and may contradict, “natural”
impulses. For example, marriage is a construct regulating, among other
things, human sexuality and is made enforceable by a linguistic contract
(Evans, 1996). The Law is created in the Symbolic Order, and the Symbolic
Order is comprised of society’s ideologies.
Having previously been brought into the Symbolic Order himself,
Moreau is both a product of and a forceful (re)producer of the Symbolic
Order. In failing to consider the creatures he converts as subjects of
their own lives, Moreau’s anthropocentric ideology places them within
the realm of objects, reinforcing a system of ethics entwined with
the Anthropocene— that “nature” is something to be acted upon and
best understood in terms of human value. Further, Moreau reinforces
the connection of civilization with the masculine and nature with the
feminine; thus, in positioning himself as “the creator,” Moreau can be
seen as an embodiment of Lacan’s father: violently bringing the creatures
into the Symbolic Order through his conversions in the laboratory, aptly
called the House of Pain, and maintaining his authority through The Law.
In a bit of irony, the terror of Moreau’s transformations was professed by
the Sayer of the Law, whose role was to keep the other creatures educated
in and governed by Moreau’s Law. “You! You made us in the House of
Pain! You made us things! Not men! Not beasts! Part man, part beast!
Things,” proclaimed the Sayer of the Law (Paramount Pictures, 1932).
Perhaps more horrifying, the violent thrust into the Symbolic Order is a
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recursive process for the creatures, as no single conversion is permanent
and requires maintenance to persist.
“That Is the Law. Are We Not Men?”
As the father, Dr. Moreau uses the language of The Law to tell his
creations what they are not: beasts. The Law tells the creatures how to perform
human by not performing animal. In psychoanalysis, The Law “is in fact
no more and no less than the Symbolic Order itself” (Evans, 1996, p. 99).
Moreau’s law separates humans from other animals, removing humans from
the natural world and re-enforcing the idea of humanity as telos; thus, The
Law serves as a means to Moreau’s envisioned end. In the 1932 and 1977
films (Paramount Pictures, 1996; Steloff, Temple-Smith, & Taylor, 1977),
The Law was the same:
Dr. Moreau: What is the law?
Sayer of the Law: Not to eat meat, that is the law.
Are we not men?
Creatures (in unison): Are we not men?
Dr. Moreau: What is the law?
Sayer of the Law: Not to go on all fours, that is the law.
Are we not men?
Creatures (in unison): Are we not men?
Dr. Moreau: What is the law?
Sayer of the Law: Not to spill blood, that is the law.
Are we not men?
Creatures (in unison): Are we not men?
In the 1996 film, The Law is elaborated,
We all want to walk on all fours, to suck up drink from
stream, to jabber, to go snuffling at the earth and claw at
bark of trees, to eat flesh or fish, to make love to more
than one. These are all bad things. These are not things
that men do. (Pressman & Frankenheimer, 1996)
This Law gets no closer to understanding what it means to be human; rather, it
only provides more examples of what humanity is not. A function of The Law
is to provide the foundational principles of society that make co-existence
possible (Lacan, 1992), and yet Dr. Moreau’s Law only provides the most
surface-level, superficial instruction.
“We Have the Same Biology, Regardless of Ideology”
“It is one of the functions of ideology to ‘naturalize’ social reality, to
make it seem as innocent and unchangeable as Nature itself” (Eagleton,
1996, p. 117). Ideologies reveal what is acceptable and what is not, sense and
nonsense, reason and madness, and central and marginal (Eagleton, 1996).
Dr. Moreau’s role as both a product and producer of the Symbolic Order
warrants an investigation into the system of ideas in Moreau’s world(s). If the
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 17, 2018: Rosenfeld
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Anthropocene is defined by the impact of humanity, then an understanding
of the ideologies guiding humanity is necessary. Moreau’s Law and actions
reveal ideological beliefs that construct the conceptual boundaries between
“human” and “animal.”
What Is Acceptable vs. What Is Not
Dr. Moreau’s Law reveals little of what is acceptable and focuses,
instead, on what is not acceptable. The most extensive version of the Law,
found in the newest of the three films, reveals that animals are not to walk
on all fours, suck up drink from stream, jabber, snuffle at the earth, claw
at trees, eat flesh or fish, or make love to more than one (Pressman &
Frankenheimer, 1996). At a minimum, this means performing human consists
of possessing the ability to walk on two feet, drinking from a container,
speaking properly, avoiding playing in nature, avoiding harming nature,
being vegetarian, and being monogamous. Singer (1975) addressed how
checklists of performing humanity ultimately reveal attitudes of speciesism
(prejudice or discrimination based on species membership), as they do not
hold up under scrutiny. For example, many humans eat meat, and several
species of animals are herbivorous. Yet, it is doubtful Moreau, or anyone
else, would see a person consuming steak and a sheep grazing grass and
proclaim the sheep to be more humanlike.
Dr. Moreau seems more aligned with the father of psychoanalysis,
Freud, than a fellow natural scientist, Darwin, in his understanding of
Homo sapiens. Freud describes the origin of law, governing what it means
to perform human, as being a sacrifice of animality. When humans engaged
in “organic repression,” we both broke free of and were uplifted from
our animal origins. From that repression of the animal, moral behavior
could emerge. However, as evidenced in the above dissection of Moreau’s
conception of humanity, we see that when people look for chasms of
distinction between human and animal, for hallmarks of enacting humanity,
we fall short. As Wolfe (2012) states, “‘man’ has to already exist to find that
which is repugnant and in need of repression and thus to rise above it, Freud’s
search for the origin of law simultaneously marks its own impossibility”
(p. 9). Moreau’s ideology reveals it is acceptable to cherry pick principles
of Darwinian evolution: Moreau sees we are continuous with all other
life forms physiologically but rejects continuity with other life forms in
mentality or emotionality.
Sense vs. Nonsense
It is through his actions that Dr. Moreau reveals what makes sense in
the ideology of his island. For example, after Moreau converts a bear to a
human, the “new human” is subjected to a test. The just-converted human
has to walk past a caged bear; this catches the “new human’s” attention, and
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he stops to acknowledge the bear. When the caged bear licks the hand of the
“new human,” Moreau whips the “new human” (for having a connection with
the bear) and proclaims angrily, “You are human! You are human” (Steloff
et al., 1977). His creation failed to assimilate to the doctor’s Symbolic Order.
Although not spelled out in his Law, an ability to connect with animals
reveals one to be more unified with nature than is allowable—or possible—
in Moreau’s Symbolic Order. Given the inability to exchange thoughts via
language, an affinity for nonhuman animals could reveal a person to be
more sensitive to nonverbal communication and to intersubjectivity. This
privileging of images and connection with nonhuman others belongs in the
Imaginary Order. For Moreau, affinity for nonhuman animals is infantile
gibberish, nonsense.
Reason vs. Madness
For Dr. Moreau, reason is progress; it is the use of speech to create
society and laws. The pity and empathy exhibited by the protagonist—a
shipwrecked foreigner on Dr. Moreau’s island—are understood by Moreau
to be personality traits of madness. Moreau scolds the protagonist for his
concern for the “new humans.” Pity is a hurdle to reason, to the progress of
making animals human, according to Moreau (Steloff et al., 1977).
Dr. Moreau’s ideas illustrate Nietzschean philosophy. It is through
the Will to Power that humans can move beyond human or superhuman,
Übermensch (Nietzsche, 1883/1999). Thus, Moreau seeks to establish
another “uplift”—the raising of lower humans (those chiefly concerned with
compassion) to higher human status (those who can overcome compassion to
focus on science and progress). If compassion is a stumbling block to making
animals human, then compassion must be an animal trait. Logic should take
precedence over emotion.
Central vs. Marginal
Language, discussed further in the next section, is revealed to be the
central feature of humanity for Moreau. Other aspects—using tools, standing
upright—are marginal. The spoken word is privileged above all other abilities
(Eagleton, 1996).
The centrality of verbal language is revealed in a scene in which
Dr. Moreau decides to temporarily convert the protagonist, this time named
Andrew Braddock, into an animal (Steloff et al., 1977). The doctor needs Mr.
Braddock to enter an animal state so that when he becomes human again, he
can report what he knew, felt, and thought. Although this is Moreau’s first
first attempt to convert a human into a (nonhuman) animal, he has some clear
expectations of what Braddock will experience when he becomes animal: (a)
his way of thinking will change; he will begin thinking in images; (b) words
will become meaningless; and (c) he will lose control over his emotions
(Steloff et al., 1977).
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Dr. Moreau’s contemplation of what will happen as Braddock becomes
animal illuminates a great deal. Dr. Moreau indicates that animals live in
the Imaginary Order, the world of images. Further, as adults, that Imaginary
Order is marginal to our human existence. Images have been superseded
by words, and it is the Symbolic Order—the world of words—that allows
one to control emotions, and controlling emotions is what distinguishes
reason from madness. This positions language as the hallmark of the
Symbolic Order.
Surface vs. Depth
For Dr. Moreau, the physical attributes of humanity are superficial.
“Human” is less distinguished from “animal” by visible differences (e.g.,
hands and feet, less body hair) than by language. “If in my tinkering, I have
fallen short of the human form by the odd snout, claw, or hoof, it is really of
no great import,” he says (Pressman & Frankenheimer, 1996). Consistent with
the Symbolic Order, once one enters the Symbolic Order, signs hold greater
importance than images. Language and the rule of law are the hallmarks of
the uniquely human Symbolic Order. Bringing animals into the Symbolic
Order by imparting language and rules on them makes them human. On
the island of Moreau, biology and genetics say less about humanity than
symbol systems do.
Language: Talking Heads
Eagleton (1996) helps make sense of the role of language in Moreau’s
conceptualization of humanity. He writes that humans are both defined and
limited by their signs: words. We use language to construct our concepts of
self, but because there is no inherent meaning in language, we are not fully
represented in the words we use to describe ourselves. Language envelops
and eludes us. All language can offer is a way to understand what one is not.
At the same time, we are logophilic, clinging to the words that separated us
from the state of bliss experienced in the Imaginary Order. Language can
be used to distance “ourselves from our sense of own bodily life and our
capacity to respond to and imagine the bodily life of other” (Diamond, 2008,
p. 53). Because the modern alphabet has no sensorial reference point—for
example, the word water has no visual or audible connection to the material
substance of water, unlike picto- and ideograms of the past—language serves
to turn humanity’s focus inward, toward its own abstract representation of
the Earth (Abram, 1996).
It was not until the 1996 film that speaking in words (instead of
“jabbering”) was added to The Law. Although this might indicate that the
two earlier representations of Dr. Moreau found walking upright to be a
greater hallmark of humanity than speaking, evidence from the earlier films
suggests otherwise. The 1932 Moreau positions giving animals speech as
his great accomplishment. The 1977 Moreau distinguishes the population
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on the island between people and “creatures without human speech,” and
says that humans were chosen above all animals and given speech. Further,
the principal sign that a creature was regressing from human back toward
its former species is that words would begin to lose meaning. It seems
that for these two interpretations of Moreau, phonocentric ideology—that
speech is the rigid boundary between humans and other animals—was so
all-consuming that he did not think to include it in The Law (Eagleton, 1996;
Derrida & Wills, 2002). It was a given that if a creature could speak like a
human, it would.
Consistent with Lacan’s Symbolic Order, Dr. Moreau believes words
structure our thoughts and even our unconscious. Because the sense of self
is constructed through words (Eagleton, 1996), it is a frightening thought
to lose words, to lose one’s self, even to return to a seeming state of bliss
in the Imaginary Order. Once an “I” has been constructed, a return to the
Imaginary Order is impossible.
When Dr. Moreau performs the procedure to turn Braddock from
human to animal, Braddock expresses anger, horror, and fear. Moreau labels
Braddock’s expression of anger as a sign that he is becoming animal. Further,
Moreau denies Braddock food. Once sufficiently hungry, the doctor offers
Braddock a live rat as a test: will he take the rat, eat it, and therefore confirm
his status as an animal? At first, it seems Braddock will take the live rat,
but he stops himself: his refusal to kill and eat the rat confirms his identity
as human. After refusing to accept the rat as his dinner, Braddock engages
in what is, for the ideology of Moreau, the ultimate act of humanity—he
tells Moreau a story from his childhood. For Moreau, humans are Homo
narrans, and storytelling is a quintessentially human act (Fisher, 1984;
Niles, 1999). Mortified at his failure to change Braddock into an animal,
Moreau yells, “Damn it, Braddock! Let go [of your humanity]! Let go”
(Steloff et al., 1977).
Again, language is shown to be the crown jewel of human authority,
the seat of distinction between human and animal (Derrida & Wills, 2002).
Language is not only what sets humans apart but is also a prerequisite for
consideration and compassion (even if compassion is considered “madness”
on the island). The protagonist encounters many caged animals and hears
many animal cries of pain before he learns of the doctor’s experiments.
However, the ethical line for him is crossed when he is able to speak to the
new humans. “Those poor things out there in the jungle, those animals, they
talk” (Paramount Pictures, 1932).
Words arise because something needs to be expressed, which means
there is something lacking (Lacan, 1992). One asks for a drink of water
because one is thirsty. According to Lacan, language creates the ultimate
sense of missing—the realization that one’s unity to a caregiver is gone—
and is also the tool that will forever be employed to try, futilely, to fulfill
that emptiness.
Kaleidoscope: Vol. 17, 2018: Rosenfeld
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The implications of privileging language as the boundary between
human and animal is problematic for two reasons. First, like the issues
presented by Moreau’s laws, it raises many questions about the humanity
of Homo sapiens. “Whatever criteria we choose, we will have to admit that
they do not follow precisely the boundary of our own species,” writes Singer
(1975, p. 19). If spoken word is the hallmark, then what are the implications
for someone who is an infant or unable to speak because of psychological or
physiological reasons? Does Dr. Moreau’s ideology consider them nonhuman
animals? If it is decided that the ability to speak is not an important marker
and that of course the non-speaking person qualifies as a human animal, then
the importance of the “speaking” marker as a distinguishing feature has just
been negated. What, then, is the next boundary?
Second, human language is an anthropocentric, logophilic conception
of communication that does not hold up under scrutiny (Derrida & Wills,
2002; Kulick, 2017). Modern language is anthropocentric because it is built
on an alphabet that systematically removed nature from its characters and
substituted abstract, human-created characters (Abram, 1996). For example,
a pictogram may draw a series of arches to represent a mountain chain, and
an ideogram may use a jaguar to represent speed. Both the pictogram and
ideogram have natural, earthly reference points. The Semitic alphabet, though
more abstract than picto- and ideograms, still maintained a connection to the
natural world. For example, the first letter, aleph, was depicted as an oxen
head, as aleph was the Hebrew word for ox. The Greek alphabet took the
letter, turned it over so that it no longer resembled an ox head, and called it
alpha, which had no nongrammatological meaning, no earthly connection
(Abram, 1996).
Language—though symbolic—both constructs lived reality and stems
from biological reality. Lacan wrote of the distinction between the symbolic
(e.g., father/authority figures) and the real (e.g., one’s biologic father) (Evans,
1996). Humans may have created the Symbolic Order through their abstract
symbol system; however, humans do possess a biological, real capacity
to create such a symbol system. Variation found in the human FOXP2
gene, a gene significantly related to speech and language development, is
associated with the human brain being wired for complex communication,
including speech and language (Enard et al., 2002). However, the presence
of FOXP2 proteins in most species (e.g., other mammals, songbirds, reptiles,
and fish) suggests the difference between human and nonhuman animal
communication is in degree rather than kind, perhaps best evidenced in the
calls of songbirds or echolocation of bats, each with variations on the FOXP2
gene (Li, Wang, Rossiter, Jones, & Zhang, 2007; Wohlgemuth, Adam, &
Scharff, 2014). Moving beyond the FOXP2 gene, social animals are known
to share information about their group and their surroundings, such as the
dance of the honeybee or the unknown mechanism through which schools of
fish act in synchrony. This communication has been shown to extend even
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to creating specific cultures in orcas, crows, and primates (de Waal, 2016).
Given the problematic issues of making language the great divide, it is no
surprise that the boundary between human and animal falls apart in each
film, and language alone is insufficient to maintain Dr. Moreau’s power.
In each telling, Moreau resorts to brute physicality to enforce The Law: a
whip, electrodes, threats of returning the creatures to the House of Pain.
The contradiction of a person needing to resort to physical violence to make
creatures live a non-violent life seems to elude the doctor.
Dr. Moreau “Is Dead”
In each of the films, Dr. Moreau’s power is contested when the creatures
discover that the doctor himself does not abide by The Law, thus de-centering
him (Derrida, 1993). Moreau either orders one creature to kill a human
(Paramount Pictures, 1932), kills a human himself (Steloff et al., 1977), or is
revealed to have been “correcting” his “children” by implanted transmitters
that allow him to administer painful shocks (Pressman & Frankenheimer,
1996). Violating The Law causes Moreau’s association with the center to
weaken (Derrida, 1993), leading to two realizations for the creatures: (a) The
Law was an inaccurate depiction of what it means to be human; and (b) if
The Law is demonstrative of the telos, then humanity is not the telos. Thus,
the law created by the center is revealed to be false, and so the center itself
is shown to be false (Derrida, 1993). This realization enables the creatures
to question their existence and Moreau’s “right” of power. Like any subject
of power, they come to understand that they have been acted upon, but they
also contain the agency to act (Foucault, 1982).
Lacan (1997a) wrote of a third order, the Real, which exists beyond the
Symbolic Order. In the Real, there is no absence (e.g., no sense of lacking),
and there is no differentiation between self and nonself. The Real is what
exists outside language and outside of symbolization. The Real is impossible
to imagine and impossible to integrate because the Symbolic Order—the
world of words—has ruptured the Real (Evans, 1996). The Real links us to
our brute physicality (Evans, 1996), our biology beyond our society. The
creatures proclaiming The Law is “no more” (before killing Dr. Moreau) can
be seen by the moviegoer as a fantasy: a fantasy of being able to return to
a previous state of fulfillment, before language and The Law. Proclaiming
the end of the law could also be a fantastical notion of having traversed the
Symbolic, transcended the Law and reaching the Real. The creatures seem to
believe that killing the divider will either reunite them with their Imaginary
Order selves or enable them to reach the realm of the Realm. Can the act
of the creatures ending The Law, thus rejecting Symbolic Order, enable
entrance to the Real? This is an unimaginable question to we who still exist
in the “world of things.” According to Lacan (1977a, 1997b, 1992), after
an individual is brought into the Symbolic Order, one is changed; there can
be no return to a fictive state of paradise in which one once lived. Ending
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Moreau’s life is an act of struggle against The Law and the ideology imposed
on them; also, it is a struggle enacted against the closest entity representing
that power (Foucault, 1982).
The question that the three movies do not answer is whether either a
return to the Imaginary Order or ascendance to the Real is possible for the
creatures. When they revert back to their animal-selves without further
treatments from the doctor, will the adulterated sense of self prevail or will
they be able to return to their natural state in the Imaginary Order? Lacan
(1977a) states that humans, even as they develop in the Imaginary, are always
already exposed to the Symbolic; they are being raised in the Symbolic world
of humans by parents who have already been brought into the Symbolic. The
nonhuman animals of the island, before Moreau, lived in a world without
the Symbolic Order. Has their exposure to Symbolic Order left them forever
changed? Will their futures be always already determined by their exposure
to The Law? How deep does the animals’ exposure to humanity run? In
sum, what the movies do not show us is what an end to the Anthropocene
might look like.
Regardless of the Order they find themselves in, Dr. Moreau, the selfappointed organizing and orienting center of the island, has been killed,
abolished, de-centered. Whenever a center is diminished, the possible play
within a structure has changed (Derrida, 1993). “To go on two legs is very
hard. Perhaps four is better, anyway. We have to be as we are . . . not as
father tried to make us,” says The Sayer of the Law following Moreau’s
death (Pressman & Frankenheimer, 1996).
Are We Not Animals?
Less drastically than Moreau, the critique offered in this paper can be
applied to all humans, who are simultaneously created by and (re)creating
the Symbolic Order. Lacan (1992) states that it is through language that
people learn what they are not. Once children start to obtain words, they
are told what they are (e.g., a girl) and what they are not (e.g., a boy). They
are the child (not in power), not the parent (the one in power). Words tell
people all the things they are not and all the things they cannot do. One of
the taken-for-granted “cannot”s is that it is impossible for people to “talk” to
animals. Derrida and Wills (2002) claim that Western society has privileged
language as the great divide—an insurmountable boundary—between
humans and other animals. Kulick (2017) agrees and states that research
seeking to address human-nonhuman animal communication faces an uphill
battle because it challenges human uniqueness. Further, attempts to teach
nonhuman animals human language—often through signing, as with Koko
the gorilla—fail because the assumption that “language” means “human
language/speech” does not consider the breadth of definitions available
for “language” (Kulick, 2017). When we fail to grasp in other life forms
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the foundations of our own language, we reject our animality and the role
of evolution in our development, and we (re)create the Symbolic Order.
Where Do We Go from Here?: Staying with the Trouble of the
Irreparable
The ideology depicted in the Dr. Moreau narrative offers an insight
into the Anthropocene. The evidence for a geologic era defined by the
presence of humanity includes the significant amount of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere, the alteration of other element cycles (e.g., nitrogen), the
modification of terrestrial water cycles, and Earth being in its sixth major
extinction (and the first caused by a biological species) (Steffen et al., 2011).
The Anthropocene may be labeled as such due to the negative effects humans
have had on the environment, but Moreau’s conceit of human uniqueness
fosters the kind of thinking that allows humanity to ignore the natural
consequences of its actions. If humans are exceptional and superior, then
the Earth exists to benefit humanity.
The story of Dr. Moreau reveals the irreparable threat of extinction, a
supreme crime against nature (Cox, 1982). By converting various species
to Homo sapien-esque creatures, Moreau is engineering the extinction of
biodiversity on his island. Conceiving humanity as the ultimate goal of all
life forms, Moreau threatens the loss of all uniqueness: the loss of a complex
human language, for it cannot be notable if it is universal; the loss of aesthetics
offered by diverse life forms; the loss of a functioning ecosystem, dependent
on the evolution of its natural inhabitants; and the loss of an opportunity
to understand better the evolution of humanity by studying the behaviors,
anatomies, and physiologies of nonhuman animals in their natural states.
All three films maintain the premise that Dr. Moreau’s procedures are
not permanent and that without further intervention, the creatures will revert
back to their nonhuman animal form. This part of the narrative offers hope,
the opportunity for the knowledge of the consequences of the irreparable
(Cox, 1982) to persuade Moreau to make a different choice.
If humans are always already shaped by the Symbolic Order, how do any
of us, let alone Dr. Moreau, go about making choices different from those that
have lead us to the Anthropocene? Haraway (2016) suggests that language
can be a path out of our current ecological trouble, starting with abandoning
the title of the Anthropocene. In rejecting the title, Haraway does not dispute
the impact humans have had on Earth and other species; rather, she suggests
the title is problematic because it serves to install humanity as Earth’s center.
In its place, she recommends titling the current era the Chthulucene, named
for a spider that builds its web in the trunks of redwood trees.
The Chthulucene can be envisioned as an era in which the interspecies
hierarchy is flattened, and all lives are understood to be interwoven,
interdependent, and symbiotic (Haraway, 2016). One method Haraway
suggests for accomplishing the Chthulucene is maintaining mindfulness of
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our language. Given the power of language to shape our reality, “It matters
the ideas we use to think other ideas” (Haraway, 2016, p. 34). Haraway does
not shy away from new vocabulary (e.g., response-ability, for cultivating
an ecology of practices; sym-poiesis, for collectively producing systems)
when the existing vocabulary falls short of capturing her intent. A second
method to bring about the Chthulucene is “making kin,” or extending our
web of relations beyond not only our own ancestry but also our own species.
Haraway reveals this possibility by reminding us, “All earthlings are kin in
the deepest sense” (Haraway, 2016, p. 161).
The Chthulucene is a counter to the Anthropocentric speciesism that
led us to the Anthropocene and Dr. Moreau to his island. Moreau brings his
creatures into an existence that is founded on the two co-dependent beliefs
that species can be sorted into hierarchies and that humans are the peak of
the species pyramid. That belief system proves to be his undoing. Moreau,
a product of the Symbolic Order, could be a mirror image of ourselves.
However, we have the (response)ability to think other thoughts.
Conclusion
Dr. Moreau’s worldview is not an outdated mindset but one that exists
today in the transhuman belief that the human race can evolve beyond its
current limitations through technological advancement (Hauskeller, 2017).
Some transhumanists argue there is a moral imperative to help animals
transcend their limitations and “uplift” them to a human-like existence
(Hauskeller, 2017).
Dr. Moreau is a fictive character, which makes for a more comfortable
critique of his actions. Reality, on the other hand, is difficult; it is difficult to
acknowledge the horror of what we do to nonhuman animals, and it is horrific
how we blur it from our consciousness (Diamond, 2008). In reality, many
species have already come and gone, have been lost due to anthropogenic
extinction (Steffen et al., 2011). Seeing the consequences of human actions,
however, there is an opportunity to avoid Moreau’s fate. We can think
different thoughts, use different words, and see different images than Moreau.
By acknowledging the inseparable interdependence of all earthlings, we can
come down from our perilous position atop the species hierarchy we created.
Once our species is able to leave the confines of the prison of searching for
uniqueness, perhaps it will allow the Anthropocene to come to an end.
Lacan (1977b) states that repetition is not a behavior determined by
habit or learned from experience. Rather, what gets repeated is what a
person has failed to grasp, has yet to reconcile. The Island of Dr. Moreau
has been re-told many times. It is time we grasp this story, so it need not
be told, again.
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